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Measures of Banking Structure
and Competition
In 1961 the Board of Governors launched
a new program for comprehensive research
in the field of banking structure and bank
competition. At that time the Board set up
a Banking Markets Unit in its Division of
Research and Statistics to undertake studies
and also to foster research in banking mar-
kets by others.
The structure of commercial banking has
changed markedly during recent years.
These structural changes have resulted from
mergers of operating institutions, formation
of holding companies and acquisitions by
them, the opening and closing of branch
offices, entry of new banks, and the failure
of established institutions. These activities
have engendered a wide interest in and con-
cern regarding the structure of commercial
banking.
BANKING STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION
The role of competition in banking has been
an important underlying issue in much of
the recent attention given by Congress, bank
supervisors, and academic scholars to
changes in bank structure. Under the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, for exam-
ple, the Board of Governors must consider
—in addition to banking factors and the
convenience and needs of the areas affected
—whether a bank holding company's acqui-
sition of a bank is consistent with the pres-
ervation of competition in commercial bank-
this and all other notes, see pp. 1221-22.
The research undertaken in this field in-
volves the measurement of concentration as
part of an over-all study of the structures of
banking markets. This article, written by
Wm. Paul Smith of the Banking Markets
Unity discusses the usefulness of concen-
tration ratios and other measures in assessing
the extent of bank concentration?
ing in the area. Similarly, the Bank Merger
Act of 1960 requires that the Federal bank
supervisory agencies consider the effect of
the merger on competition as well as bank-
ing factors and the convenience and needs
of the communities involved. In each case,
the relevant agency may not approve the
transaction—merger or holding company
acquisition—unless, after weighing each of
these factors, it finds the transaction, on
balance, is in the public interest. In merger
and holding company cases considered by
the banking agencies, competition is neither
the exclusive nor necessarily the dominant
factor in any particular case. In contrast,
competition is the exclusive issue consid-
ered by the Department of Justice in the
bank merger cases it has challenged under
the antitrust laws.
At this writing court decisions have been
rendered in three cases in which the Depart-
ment of Justice challenged a merger after
it had been approved by one of the Federal
bank supervisory agencies. In the Phila-
delphia National Bank and Lexington cases
2
the Supreme Court ruled that the contested
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mergers violated the antitrust laws by unduly
increasing concentration and eliminating
competition in the local market. In the
Manufacturers-Hanover case,
3 Judge Mac-
Mahon of the Federal District Court ruled
that the impact of the merger on competi-
tion in both the local and the national mar-
kets would violate the antitrust laws.
The courts, supervisory authorities, and
academic analyists have frequently utilized
simple measures of structure—the number
and relative size of competing institutions—
as indices of competitiveness in banking
markets. Underlying this use of structural
measures is a presumption based on a priori
reasoning that structure is a major deter-
minant of the degree of competition and
resultant performance in a market. It is
generally maintained that competition in
more concentrated markets will be less vig-
orous. As a consequence the expected per-
formance
4 of more concentrated markets
would be less desirable in a social sense.
5
Some observers have argued that bank
regulation and supervision designed primar-
ily to protect the safety of depositors and the
circulating medium have restrained compe-
tition among commercial banks and with
other financial institutions. For example,
Regulation Q's ceilings on interest rates for
time and savings deposits have restricted
the opportunities for commercial banks to
compete for such accounts. But such re-
straints on the competitive behavior of banks
apply uniformly in most areas and hence
cannot be a major cause of contrasting
behavior in differing markets. Thus, regula-
tions notwithstanding, variations in com-
petitiveness and performance in different
markets can still stem partly from diversi-
ties in market structure.
To that extent market structure may pro-
vide a meaningful proxy for the degree of
competition and market performance in a
wide range of cases and, further, structural
changes may be tantamount to changes in
competition and performance. However, the
measurement of structure is neither simple
nor free of ambiguity.
MEASURES OF BANKING STRUCTURE
The number and diversity of markets, com-
bined with the necessity for quick appraisals
of the impact of structural changes on com-
petition, have contributed to reliance on
simple indices for measuring market struc-
ture. The concentration ratio is the most
frequently used measure of market struc-
ture. It was utilized initially in connection
with broad systematic studies of the struc-
ture of individual industries undertaken by
the National Resources Committee, the
Temporary National Economic Committee,
and other groups during the 1930's. The
data prepared by these organizations were
immediately seized upon by individuals con-
cerned with concentration and market power
in manufacturing industries. Since World
War II the Federal Trade Commission, con-
gressional committees, and individual schol-
ars have prepared similar data for manufac-
turing industries during various years. The
users of the expanding tabulations of con-
centration ratios have increased more rap-
idly than the list of compilers.
Given the wide use of concentration ratios
for manufacturing industries, it is not sur-
prising that this concept was adopted by
those concerned with the structure of bank-
ing markets. The concentration ratio is sim-
ply the share of the total of some economic
variable (employment, sales, assets, etc.)
for all firms in a market that is accounted for
by a relatively few of the largest firms in that
market. The concentration ratio typically
computed for local—urban and metropoli-
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tan areas—banking markets is the share of
total commercial bank deposits in the area
that are held by the three largest commercial
banks. Concentration ratios for States most
often are for the five largest banks, while for
the entire United States the 100 largest
banks usually are selected.
These concentration ratios suggest some
of the problems inherent in their use as in-
dicia of competition in commercial banking.
The selection of the number of banks in-
cluded in the few largest whose combined
market share is computed is largely arbi-
trary. Further, in order to derive reliable
TABLE 1
CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS




































































1 All banks controlled by one bank holding company are con-
solidated.
2 Metropolitan areas are the Census Bureau's standard metropolitan
statistical areas. Some larger areas are not shown due to changes in
definitions which distort comparisons.
NOTE.—The concentration ratios for metropolitan areas are for all
commercial banks as of June 30. Those for individual States and the
United States are based on year-end figures for insured commercial
banks, except for the United States in 1962, which are figures for
December 28.
inferences from concentration ratios, or any
other measure of market structure, it is nec-
essary to determine the boundaries of the
markets involved. Also, the computation of
concentration ratios based on total deposits
rather than, for example, demand deposits
or business loans bypasses the determina-
tion of the relevant products. Such a determi-
nation is crucial to the results derived from
the use of measures of structure.
The number and size distribution of all
banks in a market affect the degree of com-
petition and the resultant social perform-
ance of that market. Thus, reliance on 3-
bank concentration ratios for metropolitan
areas obscures other structural character-
istics that also influence these markets.
While this figure gives an indication of the
extent of concentration of banking business
controlled by relatively few banks, it is silent
on the disparity of size among the larger
banks. Further, the 3-bank concentration
figures are unresponsive to differences in
other dimensions of market structure that
influence performance—such as the num-
ber of banks and the size disparity between
a core of the largest banks and the whole of
the market.
Structure of deposit markets. The failure of
concentration ratios to reflect these differ-
ences may be seen by referring to Table 2,
which shows the share of total deposits held
by each of the five largest commercial banks.
The three largest banks in each of these
major metropolitan areas hold about the
same share of total deposits; the figures
range from a low of 76.7 per cent in Syra-
cuse and Wilmington to 77.9 per cent in
Springfield, the highest. While the 3-bank
figures are virtually identical, the size distri-
bution of banks varies considerably among
these areas. The fourth largest bank in Syra-
cuse, for example, is larger in relation to the
Federal Reserve Bulletin: September 1965MEASURES OF BANKING STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 1215
largest bank in its area than is the case with
the second largest bank in three of the other
areas—Akron, San Francisco, and Wilming-
ton. Further, a comparison of the largest
banks' share reveals a spread of more than
TABLE 2
SHARES OF TOTAL DEPOSITS HELD BY FIVE LARGEST
BANKS, JUNE 30, 1964 *






















































i All banks in an area that were controlled by one holding company
are consolidated.
NOTE.—The "metropolitan areas" are the Census Bureau's standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
15 percentage points. The failure to reflect
consistently such differences in the size dis-
tribution of banks is an inescapable inade-
quacy of the concentration ratio as a meas-
ure of structure.
The futility of selecting some other num-
ber of banks—say, one—for computing
concentration ratios can be seen by refer-
ence to Table 3. Each of the smaller metro-
politan areas for which data are shown
there, has one-bank concentration figures
falling between 35.5—Waco, Texas—and
36.0—Billings, Montana. As the share of
total deposits held by the two and three
largest banks tend to indicate, the market
structures for these smaller metropolitan
areas also vary widely. Within these five
metropolitan areas there is a spread of more
than 20 percentage points in the share of
deposits held by the two largest banks and
the variation in the three largest banks'
share exceeds 32 percentage points. Hence,
the concentration ratio would not appear to
be a sufficiently reliable index of market
structure to warrant the heavy burdens that
are placed upon it.
Measures of market structure should take
account of all competitors within a market,
and they also should be more sensitive to
the different sizes of banks. A measure of
market structure developed a few years ago
by Orris C. Herfindahl, an industrial organi-
zation economist, avoids some of the diffi-
culties encountered in using concentration
ratios.
6 The Herfindahl index takes account
of the size of all banks in a market although
it is most sensitive to the largest.
7 Interpreta-
tion of figures derived from the Herfindahl
index is similar to interpretation of different
values for the concentration ratio. That is,
higher values of the index indicate more con-
centrated markets, which presumably are
less competitive and, consequently, generate
less desirable performances in a social sense.
TABLE 3
SHARES OF TOTAL DEPOSITS HELD BY LARGEST BANKS
JUNE 30, 1964
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i All banks in an area that were controlled by one holding company
are consolidated.
NOTE.—The "metropolitan areas" are the Census Bureau's standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
A comparison of figures for the Corpus
Christi and Des Moines areas illustrates
some of the advantages of the Herfindahl
index over the concentration ratio. As Table
4 shows, the three largest banks in each of
Federal Reserve Bulletin: September 19651216 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN • SEPTEMBER 1965
these metropolitan areas account for about
the same proportion of total deposits in
their areas: 71.7 per cent in Corpus Christi
as compared with 71.5 per cent in Des
Moines. However, as the figures for the
largest and the two largest banks tend to
indicate, there is considerable difference in
the size distribution of banks in these areas.
In particular, the largest bank's share in
Corpus Christi—44.8 per cent—is much
more prominent than it is in Des Moines,
where the largest bank accounts for only
30.2 per cent of the area's total deposits.
The different values of the Herfindahl index
shown in Table 4—260 for Corpus Christi
as compared with 202 for Des Moines—are
indicative of the variations in the size dis-
tribution of banks in these two areas. Simi-
larly, a comparison of the measures of bank-
ing structure for Lynchburg with those for
Corpus Christi indicates that use of the
Herfindahl index avoids at least some of
the problems that arise with arbitrary choice
of the number of banks utilized in com-
puting concentration ratios.
TABLE 4



































1 All banks in an area that were controlled by one holding company
are consolidated.
NOTE.—The "metropolitan areas" are the Census Bureau's standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
Despite its advantages, the Herfindahl
index has limitations that detract from its
usefulness as a measure of market struc-
ture. As indicated earlier, a satisfactory
measure of market structure must account
for differences in both the number of banks
in a market and the relative sizes of those
banks. As both a logical and a pragmatic
matter, this places an impossible burden on
any formula from which a single numeric
value is derived. The difficulties arise from
the attempt to measure the disparity in the
size of banks and concomitantly take ac-
count of the total number of banks in the
market area. A greater inequality of size
leads to a higher value of the index, while a
greater number of banks in the market, other
things being equal, leads to a lower value of
the index. A small number of banks in a
market is not necessarily accompanied by a
high degree of size inequality, nor are the
sizes of a large number of banks necessarily
similar.
This can be more readily appreciated by
comparing the data for San Francisco and
Syracuse given in Table 2. The structure
of banking in Syracuse reveals a smaller
size disparity of banks than does San Fran-
cisco's banking structure and thus a lower
degree of concentration. However, the
smaller number of banking institutions in
Syracuse suggests a more concentrated mar-
ket structure on that count.
Irrespective of the sophistication exer-
cised in the development of formulae to
measure market structure, the meaningful-
ness of computations based on them depends
upon a realistic, reliable delineation of the
relevant products and the market areas for
these products. Hence the analyst must de-
termine whether total deposits represent the
relevant banking product or service for
measuring banking structure and for deriv-
ing inferences of competition and perform-
ance; and whether metropolitan areas con-
stitute the relevant market area.
The metropolitan area may indeed be the
appropriate market area. If so, the State, or
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the nation, could not also constitute the
appropriate market area. Any extension of
the area covered would lead to a reduction
in the value of concentration measures. Fur-
ther, arbitrary enlargements of the areas
covered would give spurious declines in
concentration. These may generate unwar-
ranted differences in appraisals of the degree
of competition and the impact of structural
changes on market performance.
Because of convenience factors the
smaller customers of a bank—for example,
households and small business—are led
to rely on local banks to satisfy their needs
for banking products and services. But in
view of the mobility of urban populations,
the entire metropolitan area may represent
a satisfactory approximation of the relevant
market area for banking products and serv-
ices supplied predominantly to smaller cus-
tomers.
8 Alternatively, the market area for
banking products and services supplied to
such customers may be limited to the town
in which they are located or even only a
part of a metropolitan area.
9 Banks' other
customers are by no means confined to their
local areas. Many larger firms have operat-
ing divisions in several States, and much of
their banking business is similarly decen-
tralized. Large businesses whose operations
are geographically limited also find that it
is economically feasible and advantageous
to rely in part on banks hundreds of miles
from the site of their principal operations.
The market area for bank services and prod-
ucts demanded by businesses in this cate-
gory extends beyond the metropolitan area
to broad regions that may include the en-
tire nation or even transcend national
boundaries.
The characteristics and opportunities of
different classes of bank customers dictate
national as well as local market areas. How-
ever, the products that are associated with
these different geographical markets are
distinct and separable. The special check-
ing account, for example, is used almost
exclusively by local individuals. The market
for certificates of deposit, on the other hand,
may be national in scope. The different
amounts typically involved in these and
other banking products or services that can
be allocated to either a local or a national
market would distinguish them in the ab-
sence of other characteristic differences. In
fact, the size of account or transaction may
be the most useful criterion for allocating
some banking services—for example, regu-
lar checking accounts or commercial and
industrial loans—between the local and the
national markets. In the Manufacturers-
Hanover decision, Judge MacMahon relied
heavily on deposit and loan-account size as
criteria for this purpose.
1
0
The most common and the only unique
service supplied by commercial banks is the
checking account. Individuals and small
businesses typically depend on locally avail-
able banking outlets for demand deposit
services because of convenience factors.
Such customers usually maintain relatively
small balances. For example, the 1959 sur-
vey of demand deposit ownership revealed
that accounts of less than $10,000 repre-
sented almost 70 per cent of the volume and
about 99 per cent of the number of demand
deposit accounts of individuals.
1
1 The bal-
ances maintained by large businesses that
are able to obtain banking services nation-
ally, of course, are much larger. Businesses
with balances of more than $100,000 un-
doubtedly are customers whose accounts
would be accepted, and probably actively
sought, by banks in nearby or even remote
cities. Such customers should be assigned to
a national market irrespective of where they
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are located in relation to their present bank-
ing connections. Thus customers with de-
mand deposit balances of $100,000 or more
could be allocated to a national market,
while those with balances of less than that
could be allocated to a local market.
1
2
By using the data on size of accounts
collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, it is possible to illustrate the
consequences of segregating customers by
TABLE 5
THREE LARGEST BANKS' SHARE OF DEMAND DEPOSITS






























i Based on Nov. 18, 1964, data for the demand deposits of in-
dividuals, partnerships, and corporations held by insured com-
mercial banks within the standard metropolitan statistical areas as
defined by the Census Bureau.
SOURCE.—Records of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
size of account. Table 5 shows the shares
of demand deposits in differing size cate-
gories that are held by the three largest
banks in four selected metropolitan areas.
In each of these areas the share of smaller
accounts held by the three largest banks is
lower than their share of the total, and
markedly so in three cases. The largest dif-
ferences are in Chicago—where, as in other
unit-banking areas, the largest banks have
placed greater emphasis on the national
market and less on their own local market
than is true of larger branch banks in other
metropolitan areas.
There is considerable variation among
these areas in the decline in concentration
ratios as smaller accounts are considered.
The 3-bank concentration ratio for total
demand deposits is highest in Indianapolis.
In contrast, the level of concentration is
significantly higher in Akron if one con-
siders only accounts of less than $10,000.
Thus the use of total deposits—which in-
clude national accounts—in an analysis of
market structure does not give a reliable
indication of concentration in a local mar-
ket, and it may greatly overstate the level
of concentration. In metropolitan areas such
as Chicago, for example, failure to elimi-
nate national accounts could lead to a seri-
ously misleading appraisal of the local
market's structure.
Other financial institutions. The analysis
thus far has ignored the competition com-
mercial banks face from other types of finan-
cial institutions. In contrast to demand de-
posit services, most products and services
supplied by commercial banks meet close
competition from similar products and serv-
ices supplied by other financial institu-
tions. For example, mutual savings banks,
savings and loan associations, and credit
unions all provide services that are closely
competitive with commercial banks' time
and savings deposit services. Failure to con-
sider other institutions overstates the posi-




An illustration of this point is provided
in the accompanying chart. Mutual savings
banks are prominent in each of the smaller
metropolitan areas for which data are shown
in this chart. In these areas the three largest
commercial banks hold a much larger pro-
portion of time and savings deposits of all
commercial banks in the area than they do
of time and savings deposits held by both
commercial banks and mutual savings banks.
Failure to include mutual savings banks in
the market for savings deposits in these
metropolitan areas clearly gives an unrealis-
tic view of market structure and would
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lead to an unreliable appraisal of the degree
of competition in these markets. Analo-
gously, ignoring credit unions or savings
and loan associations in markets where they
are active engenders both distorted views
of market structure and mistaken assess-
ments of the extent of competition.
Unfortunately, data for savings and loan
associations and credit unions which would
permit a complete analysis of the structures
of markets in which they compete with
commercial banks are largely unavailable.
Proper consideration of competition arising
from these institutions thereby is made more
difficult. Nevertheless, this neither reduces
their importance nor excuses neglect of them
in the analysis of the structure of markets
in which they compete with commercial
banks. These institutions can be included in
a census of competitors in those markets in
which they compete with banks. Head-
counts of competitors are very useful, and
they represent the minimum compilation of
data for an analysis of market structure.
Structure of loan markets. The mainte-
nance of competition in markets in which
banks supply credit is fully as important,
from a public policy standpoint, as the
maintenance of competition in markets for
deposit services. The problems of assaying
competition in lending markets parallel the
difficulties discussed above. Conceptually,
the problems encountered in the develop-
ment of a satisfactory measure of market
structure remain, irrespective of the prod-
ucts or services involved. The delineation
of products and market areas may in prac-
tice be more difficult for loan and invest-
ment markets because of both a greater
number and diversity of the relevant prod-
uct markets and, also, the paucity of ade-
quately refined data.
The loans and investments of commercial
banks typically range from holdings of U.S.
Government securities of varying maturi-
ties to instalment loans made to individuals.
The markets for each of these asset items,
and competition within them, may be quite
different. Like deposits, asset items might
be assigned to different markets on the basis
of size—either size of loan or size of bor-
rower—or nature of the product. Undoubt-
edly the broadest market in which commer-
cial banks compete is the U.S. Government









NOTE.—Savings deposits are time and savings deposits of indi-
viduals, partnerships, and corporations. Metropolitan areas are
| j OTHER COML. &. MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
the Census Bureau's standard metropolitan statistical areas.
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securities market—an example par excel-
lance of a national market. The largest
commercial bank in the United States ac-
counts for slightly more than 1 per cent of
all Government securities publicly held,
while the three largest hold less than 3 per
cent, and all commercial bank holdings rep-
resent less than 37 per cent of the total.
The remainder is accounted for by a wide
variety of other holders ranging from indi-
viduals to insurance companies and manu-
facturing corporations. It is unlikely that
any foreseeable structural change in com-
mercial banking would have a discernible
influence on the competitive situation in this
market.
The markets for consumer instalment
loans represent a very different facet of the
spectrum of markets in which banks com-
pete as lenders. Borrowers in these markets
are largely confined to lenders in their im-
mediate areas. But within these highly local-
ized markets commercial banks typically
meet active competition from a wide variety
of sources including small loan companies,
credit unions, and sales finance companies.
Similarly, banks face competition from sav-
ings and loan associations, insurance com-
panies, and Governmental agencies in
mortgage markets. Competition from such
institutions not only dilutes the market
power of commercial banks but also reduces
the impact of structural changes—for ex-
ample, mergers—on competition in these
markets. Again, detailed data on the activi-
ties of nonbank institutions in these markets
are not generally available. Nevertheless,
simple censuses of the institutions operating
in these markets afford the basis for some
appraisal, albeit imperfect, of their effect on
competition in these markets.
In contrast, commercial banks may face
only limited competition from a relatively
few other financial institutions in some prod-
uct markets. For example, they may be the
only readily available and economically
feasible source of short-term loans to small
and medium-sized businesses in some areas.
In such cases detailed analysis involving the
elimination of data for loans made in more
highly competitive markets may reveal a
higher degree of concentration than would
be suggested by the use of data for all loans.
Such cases in which analysis of relevant
product markets shows a higher degree of
concentration than analysis based on over-
all figures are probably exceptional. As a
general rule, measure of market structure
based on aggregates, such as total assets or
liabilities of commercial banks only, suggest
a more highly concentrated market struc-
ture than actually exists.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion has considered the
major difficulties encountered in attempting
to reduce to a neat formula the measure-
ment of the structure of markets in which
banks compete. The first difficulty is a con-
ceptual one of selecting, or developing, a
meaningful measure of market structure.
The most frequently used measure of mar-
ket structure, the concentration ratio, is in-
herently inadequate for the burdens placed
upon it in the analysis of particular market
situations. Although other measures of mar-
ket structure such as the Herfindahl index
are more responsive to some crucial dimen-
sions of market structure, the results ob-
tained from their use may be ambiguous.
The other difficulties encountered in the
measurement of market structure are more
pragmatic and involve the problems of de-
fining products and delineating market areas
as well as identifying and taking account of
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the influence of all competitors upon these
markets.
For broad comparisons over the entire
spectrum of industries, concentration ratios
and other summary measures of market
structure are useful descriptive tools. How-
ever, measures of structure that are com-
puted on the basis of aggregate data with-
out regard to relevant products and markets
can be highly misleading in particular situ-
ations.
The degree of competition in individual
markets often is influenced by factors other
than market structure. One such factor,
which frequently appears in merger cases,
is the presence or absence of aggressive com-
petitive behavior on the part of individual
banks. The elimination of a bank that is
actively seeking additional business in com-
petition with the other banks and financial
institutions in its area has a very different
impact on competition from that in which
a more passive competitor is eliminated. An
appraisal of the behavior of the banks in-
volved is necessary to determine the intensity
of competition in a local market. Thus, no
matter how much care is exercised in their
development, one should not rely solely on
summary measures of structure in arriving
at public policy decisions.
1. The author wishes to express his appreciation for
the cooperation and assistance of his colleagues in the
Banking Markets Unit, especially Tynan Smith, who
reviewed the present article, and Stuart Schmid, who
undertook the computer programming necessary to
develop some of the data used in this article.
2. The Clayton Act was applied to mergers of com-
mercial banks in United States v. Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank, 314 U.S. 321 (1963) while the Sherman
Act was applied in United States v. First National
Bank & Trust of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
3. Judge MacMahon ruled that this merger's impact
on both the local and the national market was in vio-
lation of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Com-
pany, 240 F. Supp. 867 (1965).
4. Aspects of performance in this sense include,
among others: (1) the prices paid for the use of re-
sources—interest rates on time deposits; (2) the prices
charged for services or products supplied—interest
rates on loans; and (3) the degree of innovative activ-
ity—the rate at which new services are made avail-
able to bank customers.
5. The relationships between the structure of bank-
ing markets and performance in metropolitan areas
has been the subject of two recent monographs:
Franklin R. Edwards, Concentration and Competi-
tion in Commercial Banking: A Statistical Study (Re-
search Report to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
No. 26, 1964. Based on a Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard
University, 1964); Theodore G. Flechsig, Banking
Market Structure & Performance in Metropolitan
Areas: A Statistical Study of Factors Affecting Rates
on Bank Loans (Washington, D.C.: Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 1965).
Edwards' statistical study of concentration and per-
formance revealed higher loan rates in more concen-
trated markets. The data utilized by Edwards were
later employed in Flechsig's study of market structure
and performance. Flechsig utilized more refined prod-
uct and market definitions and different measures
of market structure. His analysis did not reveal any
statistically significant relationship between concentra-
tion and the rates charged on business loans once ac-
count was taken of regional variations in the supply
of funds and the demand for credit. Both studies were
confined to an investigation of only one aspect of per-
formance in 49 of the largest metropolitan areas; per-
force neither one provides direct evidence on the rela-
tionship of structure and performance in smaller urban
or rural areas. Their conclusions are further limited
by the fact that it was not possible to take account of
credit terms such as the existence and level of com-
pensating balance requirements.
6. This index was advanced in Orris C. Herfindahl's
Ph.D. dissertation, Concentration in the Steel Industry
(New York: Columbia University, 1950). An exten-
sive discussion of this and other measures of structure
is provided by Gideon Rosenbluth's "Measures of
Concentration," in Business Concentration and Price
Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univerity Press,
1955).
7. The Herfindahl index's sensitivity to the largest
firms is a direct result of its definition and computa-
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tion. The value of the index equals the sum of the
squares of the market shares of each firm. In Table 4
the decimal point has been dropped.
8. This view of the market area may be reasonable
for smaller metropolitan areas. However, it un-
doubtedly falls wide of the mark for the largest met-
ropolitan areas such as New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Detroit, and Philadelphia.
9. The Board's analyses of market areas in merger
cases has often recognized a portion of a metropoli-
tan area as the relevant market area. See, for example,
the Board's statements approving Chemical Bank New
York Trust Company's acquisition of the Benson-
hurst National Bank of Brooklyn and Provident
Tradesmens Bank and Trust Company's merger with
Second National Bank of Philadelphia. Federal Re-
serve BULLETIN, March 1964, pp. 321-24, and August
1964, pp. 1003-06.
10. He used size of loan for allocating commercial
and industrial loans and single-payment loans to in-
dividuals between the local and the national markets
and size of account for allocating demand deposits
between the local and national markets. 240 F. Supp.
867 (1965), p. 921.
11. Federal Reserve BULLETIN, April 1959, p. 380.
12. This is the size break used by Judge MacMahon
for allocating demand deposit accounts between the
local and the national markets. 240 F. Supp. 867
(1965), p. 921.
13. It should be noted that a review of the Board's
decisions under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 indicates that it has limited its consideration of
the competitive factor to competition within commer-
cial banking. In contrast, under the Bank Merger Act
of 1960 the Federal bank supervisory agencies have
frequently considered competition arising from other
financial institutions.
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